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Summary findings
According to a theoretical  model, school autonomy and  out with certainty.  Plausible predictors of autonomy and
parental participation  in schools can increase student  participation are  also plausible predictors of test scores,
learning through  separate  channels.  Greater school  and they fail tests for the overidentifying  restrictions.
autonomy  increases the rent that can be distributed  Heuristically argued, however, the potential for
among stakeholders in the school,  while institutions for  correlation with unobserved variables may be limited:
parental participation  (such as a school board)  empower  the data set is rich in observed variables, and autonomy
parents  to command  a larger share of this surplus-for  and participation  show very low correlation  with
example,  through student learning.  observed variables.
Using a rich cross-sectional  data set from Argentine  Subject to these caveats,  the results may be relevant  to
schools  (sixth and seventh grades), Eskeland and Filmer  decentralization  in two ways. First, as decentralization
find that autonomy and participation  raise student test  moves responsibility  from the central toward the
scores for a given level  of inputs in a multiplicative  way,  provincial or local government, the results should be
consistent with the model.  Autonomy has a  direct effect  directly relevant if the decentralization  increases
on learning  (but not for very low levels of participation),  autonomy and participation  in schools. Second,  if the
while participation affects learning only through the  results are  interpreted as representing a more general
mediation  of the effect of autonomy.  The results are  effect of moving decisionmaking  toward users and the
robust to a variety  of robustness checks and for  local community, the results are relevant  even if little
subsamples of children from poor households,  children  happens to autonomy and participation  in schools.
of uneducated mothers,  schools with low mean family  More important,  perhaps, the authors  illustrate
wealth, and public schools.  empirically the importance  of knowing who is
It is possible that autonomy and participation  are  empowered when  higher levels of government loosen
endogenously determined  and that this biases the  control.
results-the data available do not allow this to be ruled
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Studies revealing that schools are far from efficient in translating resources into learning
(for example Hanushek  1994,  1995)  have led to an increasing interest in the education
literature on issues such as governance, reform,  and decentralization.  Our study analyses
the potential relationships between learning in Argentine schools on the one hand and
school autonomy and parental  participation on the other hand. This introductory section
places the study in the broader literature on decentralization in education systems.
Section two develops a model in which school autonomy and participation play distinct
but related roles in determining how the school operates.  Section three introduces data
and measurement issues. Section four presents analysis  and results. Section five
concludes.
In a thought-provoking  review of the school "production function" literature,
Hanushek (1986) finds no relationship between increased resources and improved results
in schools. He concludes that schools do not use resources efficiently. I Building on this,
Pritchett and Filmer (1998) argue that the non-relation between increased resources and
increased outputs (or quality) strongly suggests that the sector is governed by a political
economy different  from a technocratic-or business-model  that would efficiently
translate additional resources  into additional outputs (learning, say). This leads into a
perspective  whereby there are rents available to be shared by users, workers,  unions,
bureaucrats  and politicians.  More broadly, the question is whether there are aspects of
how the education sector-or an individual school-is organized that determines how a
school operates and how efficient the system is in generating learning among children.
Edited volumes such as Clune and Witte (1990), Hannaway and Carnoy (1993)
and Chapman and others (1996)  are evidence of the interest in whether institutional
reforms such as decentralization lie at the heart of schools'  problems. Witte (1990),
writing on a U.S. context, concludes that arguments for and against decentralization  are
' There are of course  studies finding a positive relation between school resources and schooling  output
(Card and Krueger,  1992, is one among many examples).  Also, the disturbing "nonrelation" between
resources and performance  does, of course, have competing  explanations. If there are relevant economies to
scale in the classroom,  for instance, then high-cost,  small schools in rural areas may be confounded with
well-equipped  low-performance  schools, and these challenges are deepened by the fact that unobserved
socioeconomic  characteristics  are correlated with this rural/urban  dimension (Lazear discusses such a
structure). Urquiola (2001) uses the subsample of rural schools that have only one room to circumvent this
problem, finding that more resources raise school outputs.
Idifficult to sort out, and that there is as yet little evidence about the impact of
decentralization  on results. He comments that this makes recommendations  difficult, but
finds the logical arguments supporting decentralization compelling.  Nevertheless,  he
cautions that decentralization  and choice are not panaceas for solving the complex and
very serious problems that affect the most problematic public school districts.
There is general recognition that both centralized (France, Japan, Korea) and
decentralized (United  States, New Zealand) education systems can deliver decent results,
but there is also dispute over even quite basic issues. Though the U.S. system is seen as a
very decentralized  one, a number of scholars  seem to agree (for example,  see Hannaway
and Carnoy 1993) that the history of U.S. education over the past century has been one of
continuous centralization.  These studies also point to the fact that centralizing forces are
not just the powers of a central government to legislate the education sector:  "textbook
publishers and ideologies  about teaching practice may produce more homogeneity across
classrooms in the U.S. than central directives could ever hope to yield" (Tyack  1993
paraphrased in Hannaway  and Carnoy 1993).  Similarly, testing systems-plausibly
justified as a means of conveying quality information-will inevitably play a
homogenizing and centralizing role in shaping the industry, whether by central regulation
(as the evaluation systems found in Europe, Argentina, Brazil and in some U.S. states)  or
in a context (such as in the United States in general) where tests are chosen to varying
degrees by schools, school systems, students, and receiving institutions. Finally, higher-
level government may play a role extending beyond its regulatory and/or ownership roles
through its capacity to provide funding. Several authors argue that the gradual transition
from district toward state and higher-level funding in the United States has made the
school system less responsive to users (Witte  1990, Peltzman 1993,  and Zeigler, Tucker,
and Wilson  1977).
Among economists, advocates of efficiency gains associated with decentralization
in the education sector typically rely on two hypothesized mechanisms:  (1) competition
for students can improve schools, so that school choice for users is an important
institutional  feature, and (2) decentralization  can make the education system more nimble
by exploiting voice and  participation,  either at the level of local government or directly at
the school level,  as autonomy is expanded at lower levels in the system and ultimately to
the school level. To illustrate with a market metaphor:  assume there is a bakery at each
end of town. They could be "decentralized,"  or they could be owned and operated by the
same family. The competition hypothesis says consumers are better served under
decentralization because  the owner of each outlet profits from drawing customers from
the other.  The voice and participation hypothesis says consumers are better served under
decentralization because they are closer to the real decisionmaker-so  "talk" rather than
2"walk" is operative.  There is nothing necessarily contradictory in these hypotheses:  in
any given context, they could both be important-and it could well be the baker is more
perceptive to voice if he is exposed to competition.  Finally, centralization arguments
could rest on scale  economy arguments.
Apart from depending on underlying features (such as population density), the
potential for either mechanism to deliver results in the education sector depends on the
specific characteristics of the ongoing decentralization.  Public schools are fiscally
decentralized if they are organized by small jurisdictions that finance them out of own
revenue.  Winkler (1993)  highlights that potential benefits of decentralization then relate
to the kind of accountability pressures this could produce, and that real-world  features of
fiscal decentralization  leave varying expectations.
Government  decentralization can also refer to whether political decisions and
bureaucratic decisions  are made with reference to a local or a national constituency  (see
OECD  1993). Schools and principals could be given increased autonomy in a national
school  system without necessarily shifting final responsibility from the nation's capital to
provincial governors or mayors.  In the Nicaraguan reform, for instance,  schools sign a
contract for autonomy with the national ministry of education (King and Ozler 2000).
There is not much hard and quantitative  evidence  on whether decentralization per
se can improve the efficiency of schools through voice and participation.  Some analysts
interpret a positive effect of user charges (or local finance) on school performance  as
being due to a greater sense of ownership, which makes parental voice more effective
(Jimenez and Paqueo  1996 and James, King, and Suryadi  1996).  King and Ozler (2000)
find better test scores among schools that have more defacto autonomy in Nicaragua.2
Jimenez and Sawada (1999)  find that participation  by parents and the local community
improves  performance in El Salvador's EDUCO schools, despite the much poorer
conditions  in which they work.
The present paper builds on this literature, but emphasizes interdependence
between school  autonomy and participation.  Our model postulates that greater autonomy
increases the rent available to stakeholders at the school, and that parental participation
plays a role in directing part of this to families through increased  learning.
2 They distinguish between schools formally having attained a level of autonomy by signing  a contract
from those de facto displaying  autonomy:  the former is  not significantly associated with learming.
3In addition to parental participation and autonomy, choice and competition can be
hypothesized to determine efficiency and responsiveness  in schools. In the Argentine
system, with provinces as owners, these effects are not thought to be forceful, and cannot
be tested with the available data. In the empirical  literature on choice and competition, a
good example is Hoxby (1994), who finds "strong evidence that easier choice [meaning
smaller school districts] leads to greater productivity." Angrist and others (2001) finds
that a voucher program succeeded in increasing enrollment of poor children in Colombia
at a low cost. Methodological  challenges  are important:  two recent analyses of the Chile
education reform (Gauri  1998 and Carnoy and McEvan  1997), emphasize that the
purported higher efficiency of private subsidized schools, funded by vouchers, are due in
part to the fact that these schools attract and select children that are easier to teach.3
Several analysts conclude that competition and choice can do little to improve services
for children in poorly equipped families and/or rural areas (Lewis  1993, Gauri  1998, and
Carnoy and McEwan  1997). The present study suggests that there may be a tradeoff
between choice and participation as mechanisms to energize schools:  choice serves the
most engaged families, and mediocre schools then lose the families that would otherwise
have engaged to lift performance  (McMillan  1999).
2.  A simple model of the school
Consider a school producing multiple outputs, one of which is learning as
measured by test scores in the national evaluation system. Other outputs could be student-
related (learning as valued by families or employers locally; child care; sports; fun),
teacher-related (furthering  career or other goals; professional or leisure interests) or along
other lines (civic;  religious; nationalist orientation).  Let the technical  possibilities  at the
school be described by
(1)  g(y  s  xI..vXj  =  °
where  y, is student learning measured by test scores and  Ym  is another output such as
student sports or teacher leisure. In addition, x is a vector of inputs  for example, pencils,
bricks, teacher training) but can also include fixed characteristics  and determinants at the
school level, such as the availability of roads, bad weather, mountains and culture.
3 In a market, providers  engage in cream-skimming to get a clientele with better underlying
characteristics:  Healthy individuals for health providers, children with high ability for schools
4The essence of the relationship in (1) is that there is a link between incremental
outputs given an increase in inputs or a reduction in other outputs. For instance, an
increase  dxl in input 1 can deliver an increase in output s,  dy5 (if other variables  are held
constant) equal to
(2)  dy,  -(-ag  lag  .dx  _ (g /g  )dx.
Optimization Now let the school operate in a context which results in implicit
weights ("prices") on the various output measures,  p5, Pm.... The school can choose the
level of input for a subset, or perhaps  all, of the inputs either because it has a budget and
pays input prices  w, ,.., w,  or because  it in other ways faces tradeoffs.  Consider the
possibility that the school's outputs and inputs are governed to maximize the net
valuation of outputs minus the costs of inputs
(3)  M =  PsYs  + PmYm  -E  jwjxj  subject to g(y5,..,y.,x) = 0.
The first order conditions for optimum would then be:
For each input, i, the value of its marginal product must equal its cost:
(4)  Pgi=  =  =-  Pmgi,  and
marginal rates of substitution equal relative prices, both for inputs (5)  and for outputs
(5)  gi  Wi
g j wj
(6)  g=  Ps
gm  Pm
This last relationship  (6) is perhaps of greatest interest,  since the school's implied
priorities  p, /Pm  can in principle be inferred from the productivity parameters. Pritchett
and Filmer (1998) follow such a line of reasoning when they argue that the typical
empirical finding of no marginal product of "inputs" indicates that the school cannot be
an entity that maximizes student learning under a budget constraint.
Note that in this optimizing framework the equality sign in (1)  implies an absence
of any slack relative to what is technically feasible. As a matter mostly of terminology,
this model describes the school as having the potential to deliver many types of outputs.
SThus, what might be described elsewhere as technical inefficiency is considered here-
somewhat more neutrally-to be priority toward certain outputs (for example, a balance
between leisure or quality of life for teachers on the one hand and student learning on the
other ). This approach has certain advantages. First, there is an explicit acknowledgement
that there are several types of interests influencing school operations.  This language
emphasizes positive rather than normative  aspects. Second, with this language as a
descriptive tool, hypotheses regarding changes in implicit priorities within the school can
be analyzed from the point of view of economic inefficiency (this is elaborated on below).
Institutions:  autonomy and  participation
Let school autonomy describe the extent to which the school itself may choose
inputs (the vector x, or a strict subset of its variables). Absence of autonomy means that
constraints on inputs and outputs are given by outside procedures,  for example when the
school is allocated six teachers and a book case, rather than a budget that can be used for
teachers and other things. A subset of x would be exogenously  given to any school:
natural conditions,  rural roads,  and the parental background of the children. A way of
understanding the value of autonomy is that it allows more decisions to be taken in the
light of the level and combination of those other, exogenously given variables. Autonomy
would enable a school to reallocate resources  to address a problem, for example,
repairing a roof The value of autonomy then depends on the variability of truly
exogenous factors across the system of schools, the degree to which a system with less
autonomy would be able to allocate increases  efficiently,  and how well institutions and
incentives  are rigged to let autonomy work in favor of student learning.
Optimization theory implies that the attained value of M (the value of outputs
minus costs) can only be higher when maximization  is less constrained. Assuming that
available resources are the same, constraints can only reduce the attained value of M, and
a constraint can reduce M only if it is binding, so
M(Ps..-,Pm,WI--,Wn)2  M(Ps,--,Pm,WI,_,  Wn)
subject to xi <xi +A  subject to xi <xi
This constraint  is more likely to bind, or binds more restrictively, the less a school
has in its ability to determines the level of variablej. Similarly
(8)  M  =(M  s  A(Ps,9.P.,m  WI..,Wn,XJ+,9xj+2,..x"),
where there is one more variable constrained in the expression on right-hand side (the
assumption is that constraints that apply in both cases are the same). For example, if in
6the right-hand  side  Xj+,i  was a specific type of text book, the left-hand side corresponds to
a school with equivalent budget, which can alternatively  use the money as it sees fit.
Using this framework, autonomy is greater flexibility at the school level;  that is,
the left-hand  side of expressions  (7) and (8). It has a role explicitly linked to optimization
theory: by letting schools operate under fewer or more "lax" constraints,  autonomy
allows the school slack-gains  that can be taken out as student learning or as other
outputs.
Let participation  describe the kind of leverage parents (students and the local
community) are given in school operations-perhaps  by outside laws and regulations.
Participation thus may influence priorities implicit in school operations,  as reflected in
the implicit output prices.  Thus, participation could be representing institutional  features
such as a school board, parental representation  in the school board (for example
percentage of votes), and finally its powers (for example, whether or not the school board
can fire teachers).
Coverage of a given input can belong both in an autonomy variable and in a
participation variable, in the following way:  autonomy in the choice of textbooks and
curriculum describes the extent to which the school  can make decisions in those matters.
Participation in the choice of textbooks and curriculum,  correspondingly,  describes the
extent to which those decisions are taken with parental consultation  (or in fora with
parental representation).
Three simple hypotheses
A simple hypothesis can be illustrated as follows: Assume that the school has two
outputs," one is student learning,  y5, another is teacher leisure,  y,.  Then, as more
participation changes the school's implicit priorities between these two outputs,  one
would expect
>0
(9)  ap'  2 O,
where P is participation.  Since output prices are not observed,  but since an implication of
optimization is that elasticities of outputs with respect to own price are non-negative;
optimization theory and equation (9) imply hypothesis one:
(10)  _Y_  > 0.
7Practical realities are, of course, likely to be more complex, leading to
counterpropositions  consistent with this framework. The most obvious is that the students
and their families may care about more than one aspect of school outputs. In particular,
measuring the effects of increased participation in terms learning as defined by the
national education ministry's test system may be too restrictive and output  as perceived
by families may have increased even if it is not measured by Ys.
Hypothesis two is that test scores will increase with greater autonomy only if they
are valued:
(11)  Ys  > 0 if and only if ps 2 0.
Again, however, even within this framework, there is room for opposing findings.
Most obviously,  a school  may be subject to other pressures (including through constraints
on x that apply in the absence of autonomy)  and these may work to ensure learning. For
instance, if a rigorously regulated national curriculum constrains  school autonomy, these
constraints might protect student learning in situations where learning would lose to other
outputs under greater autonomy. If such a constraint  is binding, so that "learning" is
locked at levels that are "too high" from the school board's point of view, then autonomy
could potentially yield reductions in leaming.
Again, implicit output prices are not observed, but the assumption that
participation  supports outputs favored by students and their families, together with (11)
yields an interaction effect:
(12)  YS  > 0,
aAaP
that is, that autonomy contributes  more to leaming the higher is the extent of parental
participation,  and participation contributes more the higher is autonomy. Again, opposing
findings could have empirically and theoretically plausible explanations. Parental
influence in the school need not be the only force interested in student learning:  the
school's owner (the province, in Argentina's primary schools), teachers or regulator (the
national education ministry, in Argentina) might all be as well.5
4Another important qualifier is, of  course, that there is sufficient autonomy to give the weight of
parental participation an effect on student output.
5  The existence  of the national testing system can be seen as evidence of a national mninistry's interest
83.  Data and empirical framework
The relationship between autonomy, participation and output will be investigated
by estimating a traditional  education production  function
t=f(xj,x 2,A,P), where
*  t is test scores in the national evaluation system;
*  xi is a vector representing the socioeconomic  background of students, to represent
private inputs into the production process;
*  X2  is a vector representing  school inputs (for example the education of teachers);
*  A,P is a vector of variables representing autonomy and parental participation  at
the school level.
Notions of equity will be explored by examining whether patterns are different for
students from the poorest households,  students whose mother has less than primary
schooling, the schools with the poorest parents,  and among public schools alone.
National evaluation system data
The primary school system in Argentina has been owned by the provinces since
1978. Secondary schools were transferred  to the provinces in the early 1990s. Our sample
is a random sample of schools in a cross section from the national system of education
evaluation, with tests of children in 6th and 7th grade. It consists of urban public schools,
urban private schools, and rural public schools. However, only urban schools are
included in our analysis, since many variables are missing for rural schools. Moreover,
including rural schools would introduce new-and potentially unobserved-dimensions
of heterogeneity.
The data set is the output of an ambitious system to monitor the school system.
The system randomly samples schools in each province, and for those schools provides
the following:
For students in 6th and 7th grade,  a sample of test scores in language and math, and
a questionnaire that indicators of a child's socioeconomic  background.
in student learning  as measured. Our thrust in terms of the participation  variable is a belief that parents'
interest in learning is at least in part consistent with what the test system picks up. If it is not, however, it
should show up with a negative  coefficient on the participation variable in the test-score equation,  and
perhaps on autonomy variable  as well, if constraints  are the ministry's means of defending  learning.
9*  For teachers, a questionnaire about the teacher, the school,  and practices.
*  For the principal, a questionnaire about the school, practices,  etc.
The questionnaires for teachers and principals provide rich data on the traditional
input vector for the production  function. They also provide a number of variables for the
institutional description, or "expansion," of the production function. In particular, a range
of questions can be directly associated to notions of a school's autonomy on the one
hand, and of the participation of parents and the community on the other.
Table  1 provides summary statistics for the sample used, for all schools and
restricted to schools in the capital area, and the poorest schools. Measures of autonomy
and participation (to be defined more precisely below) are highly skewed:  30 percent of
schools with lower than mean autonomy whereas 63 percent of schools have lower than
mean participation.  The levels of both autonomy and participation are higher than
average in capital area schools,  and lower than average among the poorest schools.
Table 1. Selected  descriptive statistics of schools  in the sample
Greater
All schools  Buenos Aires  Poor  Schools
Std.  Std.  Std.
Mean  Dev.  Mean  Dev.  Mean  Dev.
Math score (standardized)  0.00  1.00  0.39  1.01  -0.47  0.86
Language  score (standardized)  0.00  1.00  0.39  1.01  -0.44  0.87
Household wealth index  0.00  2.05  0.84  1.89  -1.69  1.79
Proportion of families in poorest quartile  0.25  0.43  0.12  0.33  0.57  0.50
Proportion of public schools  0.85  0.36  0.71  0.45  0.96  0.19
Proportion of poor schools  0.25  0.43  0.06  0.24  1.00  0.00
Mean autonomy index (standardized)  0.00  1.99  0.28  1.82  -0.20  2.15
Proportion of schools with lower than  0.30  0.46  0.19  0.39  0.37  0.48
mean autonomy
Mean participation  index (standardized)  0.00  1.85  0.46  2.30  -0.17  1.73
Proportion of schools with lower than  0.63  0.48  0.54  0.50  0.64  0.45
mean participation
Number of students  24,353  2,853  5,446
Number of schools  1,118  132  279
10Conceptual issues around autonomy and participation.  the principal  components method
The model outlined above defines autonomy and participation  as specific
concepts with particular meaning in an economic model of the school. The Argentine
data contains multiple variables, each of which could be interpreted as representing (say,
for autonomy)  a very specific and narrow concept of autonomy (does the school choose
its textbooks). Table 2 gives a list of the  12 variables used to construct indexes for
autonomy and participation,  respectively. A possible use of this data would be to ask
what type of autonomy matters for school results. An alternative interpretation is that
autonomy itself is a broader concept ad that a list of questions on autonomy gives us
multiple noisy signals about a one-dimensional  autonomy, broadly defined,  granted to
this school. An intermediate interpretation  is that autonomy can be granted in several
areas, and that groups of individual questions give us signals about autonomy in each of
those areas. One classification could be: autonomy in teacher management and
organization, autonomy in curricular and pedagogical  matters, autonomy in relations with
parents,  autonomy in other matters (Table 2).
This complex problem is addressed with a flexible approach.  The results reported
here use only one autonomy concept, and use the first principal  component of the 12
autonomy variables  (the method  for participation is analogous).  This approach assumes
that the various measures are noisy signals of one underlying concept of autonomy and
one concept of participation. A variety of alternative  approaches were carried out as well:
(a) under the alternative hypothesis that all the 24 variables are relevant  in themselves;
(b) under the hypothesis that there are four relevant sub-aggregates (see Table 2); (c)
under the alternative hypothesis that more than the first principal component should be
used; and (d) using factor analysis rather than principal components,  in an identical
approach.
For the main analysis, however,  only one variable for autonomy (hypothesis one,
equation  10), one for participation  (hypothesis two, equation  11), and the interaction of
the two (hypothesis three, equation  12) are reported. For both autonomy and participation
the respective variable should be seen as a synthetic variable,  distilled from a broader
range of questions.Table 2. Variables measuring autonomy and participation
Std.
Mean  Dev.  Min.  Max.
School  autonomy
Autonomy in teachers management and organization
Decisions about organization of teacher's work  0.962  0.192  0  1
Criteria for evaluation of teachers'  performance  0.848  0.359  0  1
Autonomy in curricular  and  pedagogical  matters
Curricular innovations  0.853  0.354  0  1
Selection of didactic material  0.934  0.249  0  1
Criteria for evaluation of students' performance  0.936  0.244  0  1
Selection of textbooks  0.807  0.395  0  1
Autonomy in relations with parents
Decisions regarding parents meetings  0.963  0.188  0  1
Autonomy in other matters
Decisions about organizational aspects of the school  0.986  0.119  0  1
Decisions about elaboration of institutional projects  0.957  0.203  0  1
Decisions about inclusion of material of interdisciplinary  0.860  0.348  0  1
content
Decisions about elaboration of disciplinary norms  0.886  0.319  0  1
School plans extracurricular  activities  0.840  0.367  0  1
Parental participation
Parents  'participation  in teachers management and
organization
Decision-making regarding organization of teacher's work  0.027  0.162  0  1
Setting the criteria for evaluation of teachers' performance  0.020  0.139  0  1
Parents'participation  in curricular  andpedagogical  matters
Selection of didactic material  0.046  0.209  0  1
Selection of textbooks  0.048  0.214  0  1
Development of criteria for evaluation of students'  0.038  0.190  0  1
performance
Decisions regarding curricular innovations  0.073  0.261  0  1
Parents  'participation  in parents'convocations
Decisions regarding parents meetings  0.192  0.394  0  1
Parents'participation  in other matters
Elaboration of institutional project  0.358  0.480  0  1
Elaboration of disciplinary norms  0.283  0.450  0  1
Planning extracurricular activities  0.361  0.481  0  1
Organizational  aspects of the school  0.067  0.250  0  1
Inclusion of material of interdisciplinary  content  0.098  0.298  0  1
Pct. of parents who regularly participate in school  4.699  2.449  0  10
activities
Index of parents assistance to meetings  3.400  2.524  0  8
Parents participate  in the creation of policies  0.254  0.436  0  1
Families participate by contributing additional resources  0.477  0.328  0  1
124.  Model and results
The basic model estimated includes a rich set of child, household, and school-
level characteristics.  Socioeconomic characteristics of students cover three areas:
mother's and father's education and an index of household wealth based on
characteristics  of the home and items/appliances  available in the home, plus "higher-
order" variables  derived from these (described in more detail below).6 On the school
input side, variables include characteristics  of teachers and the principal, school
equipment and infrastructure.  In addition,  fixed effects  are included for each province to
represent omitted variables constant at the province level.  The full list of variables,  with
summary statistics, is reported  in Annex Table  1.7
In addition, the specification  includes variables based on aggregates of
socioeconomic characteristics  across families.  These "higher-order"  statistics  are
calculated for parent wealth,  and for the mother and father's education.  Using parental
wealth as an example, they are defined as mean parental wealth for a school; variance of
parental wealth at a school; and the squared difference between mean parental wealth in a
school and in the province (each of these measures  excludes the index school). The first
reason for including these aggregates  is simply that the socioeconomic background of
other children  in the classroom is potentially associated with a student's learning. A
causal interpretation would be external effects across students in a classroom. A non-
causal interpretation would be that there are variables omitted from the true causal model
(socioeconomic  characteristics  and/or school inputs), and that these are correlated with
the socioeconomic characteristics  of other families. The second reason is that these
aggregates themselves represent arguments in sensible models of autonomy and
participation. Thus, including them as variables in the model eliminates the potential  for
certain biases in the estimated effects of autonomy  and participation on student learning
(this is discussed further below in the section on potential endogeneity). For instance,  a
high variance between families in a school could make their joint governance of the
school less (or more) efficient.  Similarly, if the school's composition-represented  by the
6  Family wealth is defined as the first principal component of the set of 18 variables  describing the
assets owned by the house household (e.g.,  ownership of a refrigerator,  a car, a TV, and number of rooms
per person). The variable is used as a wealth indicator,  and also to create  subsamples of  poor students and
schools, as well as to explore the effect of within school and within province wealth averages and
variances.  Filmer and Pritchett (2001) explore the implications of using an "asset index" of this type in
analyzing school enrollment and conclude that it is a valid approach.
7 The school's  location cannot be further specified  in these data.
13mean across families-is much different from that of the province, then this could make
hierarchical management  from the province  less productive and place a specific value to
autonomy for this school. Correspondingly,  a province with high variance between
schools but low variance within schools could be one with a more productive role for
school autonomy and participation.
Table 3 reports the results for selected variables of the mathematics  and language
(Spanish) test scores models (Annex Table 1 reports the full set of coefficients and t-
statistics estimated for the first models).  There are two basic specifications:  first, a full
specification that includes all school-level  variables, and second a reduced specification
that excludes school inputs and characteristics  and includes only autonomy, participation,
and school level aggregates  of the socioeconomic backgrounds of students as school-
level variables.
The first three variables in Table 3 are autonomy, participation and an interaction
term measuring the distinct multiplicative effect of autonomy and participation
(hypothesis three, equation  12). Autonomy is significantly positively associated with
math test scores (at the 10 percent level); participation has no significant independent
effect on test scores, but the interaction between participation and autonomy is significant
and therefore participation has an impact through the way it modulates the effect of
autonomy. The R-squares  of .26 for math and .23 for language are consistent with those
found elsewhere in the school production function literature.8 Neither autonomy,
participation, nor their interaction is significantly associated with language test scores.
The other variables in the language model are significant,  and in general the overall
explanatory power in the production functions for the language test is not dramatically
lower than that of the math test.
8 The relatively low values do suggest that a large part of the variation in learning outcomes  is not
explained using these simple models.
14Table 3. Selected  results from basic models of math and language test scores
(all  students in urban areas)
Model with  Model without
school inputs  school inputs
I  II  III  IV
Math  Language  Math  Language
Autonomy  0.017*  .006  0.018*  0.007
(1.81)  (0.71)  (1.91)  (0.87)
Parental participation  -0.007  0.006  -0.003  0.005
(-0.70)  (0.67)  (0.29)  (0.56)
Autonomy and participation  interaction  0.012*  0.003  0.012*  0.003
(2.10)  (0.59)  (1.98)  (0.72)
Parent wealth  0.029*  0.013*  0.030*  0.012*
(8.65)  (3.21)  (8.72)  (3.19)
Mother's education  0.046*  0.046*  0.046*  0.046*
(8.64)  (7.36)  (8.64)  (7.34)
Father's education  0.019*  0.024*  0.019*  0.024*
(3.63)  (4.07)  (3.66)  (4.11)
Number of observations  23,961  22,872  23,961  22,872
R-squared  .26  .23  .24  .21
P-value of joint test of sig. of autonomy and  .0738  .7141  .0939  .6177
interaction
P-value of joint test of sig. of participation  and  .1056  .6263  .1372  .6266
interaction
P-value of  joint test of significance of school  .0136  <.001
inputs
Note: t-statistics adjusted for school clustering,  * indicates significance at the  10 percent level. Models
include parent wealth (school mean, school variance, school deviation from province mean), mother's
education ("),  father's education ("), public school dunmmy variable, Provincial dummy variables (22),
student characteristics  (age, gender),  school characteristics  (65 variables).  See Annex Table  1  for details.
In order to illustrate the interactive effect of autonomy and participation  on math
test scores, Figure  1 shows the marginal effect of each as a function of the other. For
example, if the model estimated is
(13)  t = a +±/3aA  +,8pP  +/lapAP  + other terms,
then the top left panel of Figure 1 shows
(14)  DA =A  = A  + A/pP,
aA
1sthat is the effect of autonomy on test scores as a function of participation.9 The lower left
panel shows the frequency distribution of the participation variable.  Autonomy has a
positive effect on math test scores (the line lies above zero)  and this effect is increasing in
the extent of parental participation (the line slopes upward).  Above a value of about zero
for participation (which is larger than the value for 60 percent of the sample) the effect of
autonomy effect is positive and significant. The relationship between test scores and
participation  is insignificant over the whole range of values of autonomy. For the values
of autonomy where most of the sample lies, the point estimate of the marginal effect is
particularly close to zero.
It is possible that this approach sets the hurdle too high for measuring the effect of
autonomy and participation. The specification estimated, derived from the model outlined
in Section 2, includes a full set of variables capturing school level educational  inputs. An
alternative formulation could have yielded a hypothesis whereby the impact of autonomy
and participation was through changing the levels of these inputs. In order to explore this
possibility Table 3 also reports (in columns III and IV) the same model but excluding
these school input variables. While these variables are significantly associated  with test
scores in the full model (with p-values of the joint tests of significance equal to .0136 and
less than .001  in the math and language models respectively),  their exclusion does not
change the estimated relationship between test scores and autonomy and participation:
point estimates are virtually identical and the pattern of significances is the same.
9  The panel also shows the upper and lower bounds of the 95 percent confidence  interval based on the
2  C)2  +  202  +  2Pp  n  8"  hr  2  2  n  o  variance estimate for the derivative:  a  =  ++,  h  p  PpaPap  where  0  ad  are
variance of the estimates of /3a and  ,6 ap respectively, and cr,,,,  is the covariance  between the
estimates.
16Figure 1. The marginal effect of autonomy given participation,  and of participation given autonomy on math test scores
(and cumulative distribution of participation and autonomy)
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17Potential  endogeneity of  autonomy and  participation
One potential problem with these estimates is the fact that schools that are more
autonomous,  or in which parents participate more, might be different in ways not
captured  in the data. If these differences  are correlated with autonomy and participation
but also have an independent effect on test scores (that is, not merely through autonomy
and participation),  then the parameter  estimates could be biased. For example, if schools
that appear more autonomous reflect more "activist"  communities and have otherwise
better characteristics that would lead to higher test scores regardless of their level of
autonomy, then the coefficient would overestimate the impact of autonomy. Likewise, if
more "motivated" parents are more likely to participate in school affairs and also more
likely to encourage their children to do schoolwork  at home (even in the absence of
participation in school affairs) then the coefficients would be overstating the role of
participation  by attributing these omitted effects to it. These problems would occur,
however, only if the variation across communities in the unobserved "activism"
dimension  and across families in the "motivation" dimension were not adequately
captured through other exogenous variables. For this reason, the extensive data set, with a
rich set of socioeconomic characteristics  and school variables, leaves less room for
potentially omitted variables in the test-score equation (at least by the standards of the
literature on education production finctions).
In order to deal with this problem, one would need either an experimental
framework where some schools were randomly "allocated" more or less autonomy and/or
parental participation,  or one would need a statistical method robust to the problem. The
typical statistical approach is to use instrumental variables.  In this approach, a valid
"instrumental variable"  for autonomy would be one assumed to affect autonomy but not
test scores directly (i.e., other than through its effect on autonomy).  The Argentine data
set does not include what could be rationalized ex ante as valid instruments.
Nevertheless,  two main modifications  to the basic  setup were carried out in order to
explore potential instruments.
First, provincial dummy variables were excluded from the test-score equation to
include them in a first stage of an instrumental variables procedure. The assumption
underlying this approach would be that the function relating inputs to test scores is stable
across provinces, but that the degree of autonomy  and participation is determined in part
by provincial  level policies. Indeed, in a first-stage regression model explaining
autonomy or participation,  the provincial dummy variables are highly jointly significant.
In addition, the "incremental R-squared," that is the additional variation explained by the
provincial dummy variables when they are added to the first-stage autonomy or
18participation regressions (including all other exogenous variables),  is between .04 or .05
(from a base of about 0.16,  i.e.,  25 percent) which is reasonable when compared to other
values found in the literature. Nevertheless,  the approach fails a test of overidentification
(Annex Table 2). Note that since one needs to assume that the model is at least just
identified in order to estimate it consistently,  one can only test the validity of the
overidentifying restrictions.  The test soundly rejects the validity of these restrictions,
suggesting that the provincial dummy variables are not a feasible way to test and correct
for potential endogeneity.  An intuitive way of understanding this finding is that the
province dummies have power in explaining test scores even after controlling for their
impact via autonomy and participation.'(  Ignoring these problems and carrying out the
estimation yields a positive and significant  effect on participation,  and insignificant
effects on autonomy and the interaction term.
The fact that valid instruments are difficult to come by should not be too
surprising:  despite the richness of the data set it is very difficult to rule out variables from
a test score equation a priori. Provincial dummies belong in the test-score  equation not
on theoretical a priori grounds (province names are not an input, strictly speaking), but
based on the plausible empirical argument that they are correlated with omitted variables
in the test score equation-a finding confirmed by ours and the most similar studies.
The second main modification to the basic setup was to exclude certain variables
from the production function, "freeing" them for use as instruments. The variables
excluded were the within school variance of wealth and parental education, as well as the
squared deviation  from provincial averages for wealth and parental education.  Again, the
assumption justifying this approach would be that these variables  are not direct inputs
into the production of test scores, but that they influence  scores only because they are
associated with more or.  less autonomy and participation.  Indeed,  a plausible theoretical
model could specify these heterogeneity measures as determninants of autonomy and
participation.  Despite this, these variables perform extremely poorly as identifying
instruments at the first stage regression. They are not jointly significant in a regression
explaining  autonomy or participation,  and they add less than 0.01 to the R-square of the
regression (Annex  Table  1). Clearly these are very weak instruments. Moreover,  they fail
'( More formnally,  the test involves regressing the IV residuals on the set of exogenous variables and
multiplying the resulting uncentered R-square by the sample size. Under the null hypothesis that the
instruments are valid, the test statistic is distributed as chi-squared with degrees of freedom equal to the
number of instruments minus  the number of endogenous variables  (see Deaton,  1997, p.  112, and Davidson
and MacKinnon,  1993, pp. 232-37).
19the test for overidentifying restrictions, indicating that (under the assumption that at least
three of them are valid to identify the model) the remaining three have a direct effect on
test scores. Again, this approach does not seem to be validated by the data. Carrying out
the second-stage regression regardless of the problems  yields insignificant effects on all
three variables (unsurprisingly given their weakness  as first stage explanatory variables).
A minor variant of this approach was to exclude the school average levels of  the
socioeconomic  variables under the same assumption and the results were very similar.
It is not possible to rule out that the results from Table 3 are biased because of
correlation with unobserved (and perhaps unobservable)  variables, but the fact that we
are able to control for many family and school characteristics suggests that the problem
is, at least, limited. Average wealth at the school level is significantly positively
correlated with autonomy, and the average  education level of mothers is significantly
positively correlated with both autonomy and participation.  However, while these
correlations  are statistically significant, they are very small (less than 0.  1; Annex Table
3). The correlations with the other socioeconomic characteristics  (and transformations)
are smaller still, and all are insignificantly different from zero. While this certainly
doesn't rule out that autonomy and participation might be correlated with other
unobserved attributes of households,  the low correlation with observed socioeconomic
attributes suggests that the unobserved variables might not be such a problem.
Robustness to changes in specification
Given that the search for valid instruments was unsatisfactory, robustness checks
were carried out reverting to specifications that include province dummy variables and
the socioeconomic  variables and transformations thereof in the test score equations." 1 The
results for mathematics test score are reported  in Table 4; language test score results are
not reported since the coefficients  on the autonomy and participation variables remain
insignificant across the various models estimated.  To the extent that the assumptions
asserted in the search for valid instruments described above are true, these potential
causes of bias would be mitigated by the fact that the variables are controlled for directly
in the regression.  That is, provincial dummies and the set of socioeconomics variables
and transformations will capture a large part of the bias introduced-if any-by the fact
that "community activism" and "parental motivation" are not in the regression itself.
" Perhaps  a more satisfactory approach would be to use supplementary information at a lower
administrative  level than the Province. Unfortunately,  as mentioned above, these are not identifiable in
these data.
20Note that in addition to these variables, the model includes  a large set of school-level  and
household-level variables, which will attenuate the bias problem as well.
Column I of Table 4 repeats the earlier result for comparison.  Column II reports
selected results that include  (linearly) higher order components  derived from the principal
components  analysis of the autonomy variables, the participation variables,  and the
variables capturing household wealth.  The results are virtually identical of the basic
model that includes only the first principal component for each of these. First, there is no
change in the estimated coefficients of autonomy and participation.  Second, while some
of the coefficients for subsequent principal components  are significantly  different from
zero, they do not have a pattern of declining significance  to indicate a cut-off point.
Moreover, the pattern of factor loadings on the variables that make up these components
do not lead to a natural interpretation  of the various indexes. Specifications  with "group"
variables (as described in Table 2) gave similar conclusions, as did specifications with all
the 24 variables  (12 for autonomy,  12 for participation):  one autonomy measure and one
participation measure yields the most interpretable  and consistent model across
specifications.  The same exercise using factor analysis, rather than principal component,
to aggregate variables  yielded no qualitative differences.
Column III reports selected results from the specification  that excludes the
variables that are derived from aggregating socioeconomic  characteristics  across children
and across schools. Again, the results are remarkably similar to those that include them-
although the coefficient on autonomy is now significantly different from zero at the 5
percent level.  Column IV reports selected results from a model that includes all the
variables that make up the wealth indicator individually, rather than including the
aggregate  derived from principal components analysis.  Again, the coefficients and
significances of the autonomy and participation variables are virtually identical to those
from the basic model. This suggests that we do not loose much information through
aggregating,  but rather gain in our ability to interpret the overall relationship between
household wealth and test scores.
21Table 4. Selected  results from basic models  of math test scores  with variations on the
specification  and inclusion of certain variables
(all students in urban areas)
I  II  III  IV
Basic,
excluding
Basic,  average,  Basic,
Basic  including  variance  and  including  all
(Table 3,  higher order  deviation  from  asset variables
Column I)  PC  province  individually
Autonomy  0.017*  0.015*  0.020*  0.018*
(1.81)  (1.73)  (2.12)  (1.98)
Participation  -0.007  -0.006  -0.001  -0.007
(0.70)  (0.60)  (0.12)  (0.66)
Autonomy and participation
interaction  0.012*  0.010*  0.011*  0.012*
(2.10)  (1.86)  (1.99)  (2.09)
Parent wealth  0.029*  0.033*  0.057*
(8.65)  (9.53)  (12.02)
Mother's education  0.046*  0.045*  0.065*  0.039*
(8.64)  (8.51)  (9.96)  (7.28)
Father's education  0.019*  0.019*  0.032*  0.013*
(3.63)  (3.62)  (5.01)  (2.48)
Autonomy variables 2nd PC  0.014
(0.96)
Autonomy variables  3rd PC  0.018
(1.16)
Autonomy variables 4h PC  0.005
(0.32)
Participation variables  2nd PC  -0.001
(0.05)
Participation variables 3d PC  -0.028
(1.69)
Participation variables 4th PC  -0.016
(1.03)
Wealth variables  2nd PC  0.014*
(2.87)
Wealth variables 3d PC  -0.043*
(6.30)
Wealth variables 4'  PC  -0.009
(1.39)
Number of observations  23,961  23,961  23,963  23,961
R squared  0.26  0.27  0.24  0.27
Note: t-statistics adjusted for school clustering,  * indicates significance  at the  10 percent level.  Except
where noted, models include parent wealth (school mean, school variance,  school deviation from province
mean), mother's education ("), father's education ("), public school dummy variable, provincial dummy
variables (22), student characteristics  (age, gender),  school characteristics  (65 variables). See Annex Table
I for details.
22Exploring equity: the relationship  in subsets of students and schools
Table 5 reports selected results after restricting the sample to subsets of students
and schools. These variations on the basic model (reproduced in Column I for
comparison)  yield remarkably similar results: autonomy matters on its own, participation
is insignificant alone, and the combination of autonomy and participation has a
significant positive effect.  Columns II and III estimate the model for "poor students"
(students whose family wealth index is in the poorest quintile) and "poor schools"
(schools in the poorest quintile of schools based on average family wealth in the school).
For poor students the coefficients  on autonomy, participation,  and the interaction are
almost identical to those from the basic model: there is no indication that autonomy and
participation are less associated with learning for the students from poorer households.
Restricting the sample to the poorest schools does show a difference: the magnitude of
the effects are larger.  In these schools autonomy is more strongly associated with scores,
and the effect grows sharply with the level of parental participation.  This is illustrated in
the top left panel of Figure 2 which repeats Figure  1 restricted to students from the
poorest schools. The figure shows that above a value for the participation index of-.4
(corresponding to slightly more than 40 percent of school) the relationship  between
autonomy and test scores is positive and significantly different from zero. Moreover,  the
magnitude of the marginal effect is substantially larger than that derived for the sample as
a whole.
Column IV reports selected results for a similar variation:  it is estimated on the
roughly 20 percent of the student sample for which the mother has less than primary
education, and the result is again no substantial difference in the coefficients  for
autonomy and participation  as compared to the "all student" or "all poor student"
samples.  Column V reports the selected results for public schools only. These constitute
about 80 percent of the sample, and 95 percent of the poorest quartile. The general
pattern of results is slightly strengthened:  autonomy matters, and participation matters
when in combination with autonomy.12
12 A similar model for private schools revealed somewhat different results:  participation was
significantly negatively related to test scores and autonomy was not directly related to scores.  The
interaction variable was  significant and the combined effect ranged from significantly negative to
significantly positive. It is important to note that this is a sub-sample with very different levels for most
variables:  Private schools on average have comparatively  high levels of autonomy - while for participation
the levels and variation more comparable  to the larger sample.
23Table 5. Selected  results from basic models  of math test scores with variations on the
subsets of schools  and students included
(urban areas)
I  II  III  IV  V
All students
(Table 3,  "Poorer"  "Poorer"  Mothers with no  Public
Column I)  students  schools  schooling  schools
Autonomy  0.017*  0.020*  0.071*  0.029*  0.020*
(  1.81)  (1.82)  (2.70)  (2.26)  (2.04)
Parent participation  -0.007  -0.011  -0.048*  -0.003  -0.003
(-0.70)  (0.92)  (2.01)  (0.18)  (0.25)
Autonomy and
participation
interaction  0.012*  0.011*  0.049*  0.023*  0.011*
(2.10)  (1.87)  (2.85)  (2.86)  (1.91)
Parental wealth  0.029*  0.011  0.032*  0.030*  0.031*
(8.65)  (1.14)  (5.76)  (4.06)  (8.50)
Mother's education  0.046*  0.027*  0.022*  0.040*
(8.64)  (2.56)  (2.31)  (7.11)
Father's education  0.019*  0.010  0.005  0.009  0.016*
(3.63)  (1.03)  (0.51)  (0.80)  (3.00)
Number of
observations  23,961  5,968  5,340  4,722  20,105
R-squared  .26  0.17  0.23  0.20  0.23
Note: t-statistics adjusted for school clustering, * indicates significance at the 10 percent level.  Models
include parent wealth (school mean,  school variance,  school deviation from province mean), mother's
education ("), father's education ("), public school dummy variable, provincial dummy variables (22),
student characteristics (age,  gender),  school characteristics (65 variables).  See Annex Table 1 for details.
24Figure 2. The marginal effect  of autonomy given participation, and of participation given
autonomy on math test scores,  poorest schools  only
(and cumulative  distribution of participation and autonomy)
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5. Conclusions
This paper set out to use a rich dataset-at least compared with the literature on
educational production functions-to analyze whether school autonomy and participation
by parents are associated with learning over and above what would be expected  given
socioeconomic background  and other school inputs. The conclusion-the interaction of
autonomy and participation matters for learning (in mathematics)-is consistent with our
theoretical model and robust to varying the specification  estimated.  Furthermore, the
effect is stronger among the poorest schools,  and as strong for children of poorer
households.  The possibility that the results biased due to endogeneity (i.e., correlation
between unobserved  variables and autonomy and participation),  cannot be ruled out by
statistical methods, but the inclusion of many observed inputs hopefully mitigates the
problem. Furthermore,  the low correlation between autonomy  and participation  on the
one hand and observed variables on the other suggest that the bias problem is likely not
severe.
25A positive effect on learning attributed to participation and autonomy at the
school level is relevant to the question of decentralization in two ways: (1)  if
decentralization leads to more autonomy and participation al the school level, then the
-results appear to be relevant without further assumptions, and (2) decentralization
typically would mean more autonomy and electoral participation  at lower levels of
government,  and the results are relevant if one assumes they reflect more general effects
of bringing decisions closer users or the community geographically and jurisdictionally.
Nevertheless, both interpretations  require restrictive assumptions: it is not necessarily the
case that general decentralization  in the sector (say, transferring schools from provinces
to local government)  leads to more autonomy and participation at the school level,  nor is
it necessarily the case that bringing decisionmaking  closer to the school (say to, local
government) has effects similar to decisionmaking  at the school. Thus, the relevance of
this analysis for any specific dimension of decentralization reform must rest much on the
particular case.
26Annex Table 1. Variables, summary statistics, and estimates for one model  (N=23,961)
Basic Model: Math test score
(Full  model of Table 3  Column I)
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev.  Coefficient  t-stat
Math score (standardized)  0.01  1.00
Language score (standardized)  0.01  1.00
Autonomy index - first PC  0.03  2.00  0.017  1.81
Participation index - first PC  0.04  1.89  -0.007  0.70
Interaction  bw Autonomy and Participation  indexes  0.59  3.18  0.012  2.10
Household  wealth index  0.01  2.05  0.029  8.65
Mean hh wealth  within school  0.00  1.29  0.147  4.66
Variance of wealth within  school  2.67  1.21  -0.004  -0.34
Sq dev of wealth in school  rel to province  1.35  1.86  0.000  0.01
Mothers education  1.78  1.18  0.046  8.64
Mean mothers ed in school  1.78  0.60  0.020  0.28
Variance of mothers ed within  school  1.07  0.38  0.196  -2.85
Sq dev mothers ed in school rel province  0.34  0.39  -0.147  -1.89
Fathers education  1.74  1.17  0.019  3.63
Mean fathers ed in school  1.74  0.60  0.044  0.66
Variance  of fathers ed within  school  1.07  0.39  -0.053  -0.77
Sq dev fathers ed in school rel province  0.34  0.40  0.084  1.05
Students Age  3.72  0.83  -0.110  -12.72
Male  0.49  0.50  0.022  1.57
More than X students in school  0.17  0.37  -0.057  -0.89
Number of students  6.06  2.73  0.002  0.26
Facility building good and adequate  0.60  0.49  0.022  0.48
Fumiture good and adequate  0.49  0.50  -0.028  -0.62
Classroom good and adequate  0.55  0.50  0.010  0.21
Library  good and adequate  0.46  0.50  0.020  0.52
School yard good and adequate  0.50  0.50  -0.033  -0.81
Bathrooms  good and adequate  0.41  0.49  -0.035  -0.83
Student desks are  in good state  0.63  0.48  0.063  1.50
Boards are in good state  0.68  0.47  0.003  0.07
Lights are in good state  0.71  0.45  -0.021  -0.43
Heat is in good state  0.39  0.49  0.048  1.17
Vents are in good state  0.73  0.44  -0.098  -1.93
Surface/student is in good  0.67  0.47  -0.005  -0.12
Director has a computer for  school duties  0.35  0.48  -0.005  -0.14
Director s age  3.75  0.65  0.016  0.61
Years  of experience  as director  1.96  1.12  -0.006  -0.36
Books are available  for teacher and are good  0.82  0.38  0.017  0.36
Magazines  are avaliable and are good  0.52  0.50  0.014  0.40
Manuals and books are avaliable  for student and are good  0.66  0.47  0.042  1.09
Other textbooks  are avaliable  for student and  are good  0.64  0.48  0.063  1.63
Working Guides  are avaliable  for students and  are good  0.31  0.46  -0.087  -2.15
Maps and Charts are avaliable and are good  0.59  0.49  0.034  0.93
Geometry tools are avaliable  for blackboard  and are good  0.65  0.48  -0.002  -0.06
Videos  are avaliable  and are good  0.63  0.48  -0.001  -0.01
Other  Software are avaliable and are good  0.00  0.03  0.394  2.32
Projectors are avaliable and are good  0.29  0.46  0.040  0.94
Retroprojectors  are avaliable  and are good  0.18  0.38  0.096  1.89
Tape players are avaliable and are good  0.65  0.48  0.049  1.36
VCRs are avaliable  and are good  0.79  0.41  -0.003  -0.06
Copy machines are avaliable and are good  0.27  0.44  0.093  2.28
Computers are avaliable for students and are good  0.33  0.47  -0.036  -0.89
TVs are avaliable and are good  0.83  0.38  -0.025  -0.46
Labs  are avaliable  and are good  0.13  0.33  0.036  0.58
Lab materials are avaliable  and are good  0.29  0.45  -0.018  -0.42
Continued  ...
27Annex Table A (continued)
Basic  Model: Math test score
(Full  model of Table 3  Column I)
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev.  Coefficient  t-stat
Textbooks for students-received  through Social Plan  0.69  0.46  -0.007  -0.09
Textbooks  for library-received  through Social Plan  0.56  0.50  -0.046  -0.74
Textbooks  for teachers-received  through Social Plan  0.55  0.50  0.052  0.83
Money to improve building-received  through Social Plan  0.26  0.44  0.039  0.95
Materials  for students-received  through Social Plan  0.70  0.46  -0.078  -1.01
Materials  for teachers-received  through Social Plan  0.44  0.50  0.027  0.61
Didactic  materials-received  through Social  Plan  0.53  0.50  -0.108  -1.99
Money for institutional initiatives-received  through Social Plan  0.22  0.42  -0.056  -1.31
Percentage of students receiving free meals  1.50  1.52  -0.003  -0.19
Percentage of students receiving a free glass of milk  2.65  1.97  -0.001  -0.12
Percentage of students receiving free academic support  1.32  1.34  0.015  1.23
Percentage of students with alleviated work load  3.44  1.87  -0.012  -1.01
Average  teachers age  2.64  0.57  0.083  1.70
Average  years of teaching experience  of teachers  3.55  0.97  0.009  0.31
Problem to innovate cunicula  0.34  0.47  0.006  0.12
Problem to innovate  teaching methods  0.34  0.47  -0.028  -0.51
Only school  in the neighborhood  0.24  0.43  0.091  2.09
Distance to nearest school  2.00  1.08  -0.006  -0.84
Evaluation of school  regard community  3.44  1.14  0.023  1.40
Director receives information regarding training course offerings  1.34  0.62  0.017  0.57
Quantity of information received by director about curricular  dev.  1.51  0.65  -0.026  -0.79
Quantity of informnation received by director about school management  1.40  0.67  0.008  0.25
Share of teachers with title: school  teacher  0.22  0.26  -0.026  -0.16
Share  of teachers  with title: primary school professor with higher non-univ.  0.70  0.29  -0.093  -0.57
Share of teachers  with title: primary school professor with higher univ.  0.05  0.14  0.040  0.17
Share of teachers with title: professor with higher non-univ. education  0.04  0.12  -0.250  -1.37
Share of teachers with title: professor with higher university  education  0.01  0.05  0.167  0.47
Share of teachers with title:  "profesional universitario"  0.01  0.07  0.158  0.51
Share of teachers with other title  0.06  0.13  -0.183  -1.45
Share of teachers with no title  0.00  0.02  -0.249  -0.55
Share of teachers  with more than one position in this school  0.06  0.16  0.210  1.68
Share  of teachers  who work in another school  0.22  0.25  -0.044  -0.65
Public school  0.84  0.37  0.086  1.40
MCBA  0.05  0.22  0.150  1.19
CABA  0.04  0.19  -0.019  -0.13
Catamarca  0.05  0.22  -0.189  -1.25
Chubut  0.06  0.23  -0.270  -2.19
Cordoba  0.01  0.07  -0.787  -4.55
Comentes  0.05  0.22  0.150  1.16
Chaco  0.06  0.24  0.112  0.81
Entre  Rios  0.06  0.23  0.142  1.08
Formosa  0.05  0.21  -0.085  0.60
Jujuy  0.06  0.24  0.253  1.80
La Pampa  0.04  0.20  -0.020  -0.16
La Rioja  0.04  0.19  -0.301  -2.14
Mendoza  0.04  0.20  0.274  1.98
Misiones  0.05  0.22  -0.136  -0.99
Neuquen  0.03  0.18  0.192  1.47
Rio Negro  0.03  0.18  0.133  0.94
Salta  0.06  0.23  0.365  2.75
San Juan  0.06  0.23  0.254  1.93
San Luis  0.04  0.19  -0.211  -1.65
Santa Cruz  0.02  0.13  -0.339  -2.17
Santa Fe  0.05  0.21  0.251  2.00
Santiago del Estero  0.04  0.21  -0.237  -1.45
Constant  0.117  0.37
28Annex Table 2. Tests for incremental explanatory power,  and of overidentification, of
potential instrumental variables
IVI  IV2  IV3
Within school variance of  Same as IV2,
socioeconomic variables,  plus school level
squared "distance  "from  averages of
Province  provincial  average  socioeconomic
Instruments  dummies  socioeconomic variables  variables
Number of instruments  22  6  9
Incremental R2, autonomy  .0376  0.003  0.008
F-test  1.73  0.90  1.48
(p-value)  (0.0199)  (0.495)  (0.149)
hicremental R2,  .0512  0.003  0.008
participation
F-test  3.42  0.89  1.39
(p-value)  (<0.0001)  (0.501)  (0.189)
Incremental R2, autonomy  0.262  0.009  0.010
and participation
interaction
F-test  1.02  1.95  1.69
(p-value)  (0.4327)  (.070)  (0.086)
P-value of test for  <0.0001  ,  0.0387,  <0.0001  reject
overidentification  reject  reject
Annex Table 3.  Pairwise correlations between  school level  autonomy  and participation
indices and socioeconomic  characteristics (N=1,118)
Autonomy  Participation
index  index
Parental wealth, school mean  0.0804  0.0426
(0.0072)  (0.1545)
Parental wealth, school variance  -0.0217  -0.0006
(0.4690)  (0.9840)
Parental wealth, school  deviation from province mean  0.0168  -0.0186
(0.5751)  (0.5343)
Mother's education, school mean  0.0518  0.0722
(0.0832)  (0.0158)
Mother's education,  school variance  -0.0004  -0.0255
(0.9904)  (0.3955)
Mother's education,  school deviation from province mean  0.0245  -0.0160
(0.4128)  (0.5930)
Father's education,  school  mean  0.0576  0.0621
(0.0542)  (0.0380)
Father's education,  school variance  -0.0361  0.0130
(0.2287)  (0.6649)
Father's education,  school deviation from province  mean  0.0159  -0.0382
(0.5950)  (0.2013)
Note: P-values  in parenthesis.
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